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SEX, THEORY, & PRACTICE:
RECONCILING DAVIS V. MONROE &
THE HARMS CAUSED BY CHILDREN
Michele Goodwin*
Education is perhaps the most important function of the state and
local governments.1
INTRODUCTION
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education2 is considered by
many to be a groundbreaking sexual harassment case of monumental
significance.3 At the end of the twentieth century, it stood as the first
case granted review by the United States Supreme Court that in-
volved a peer sexual harassment claim brought under Title IX of the
U.S. Code. In a five to four decision with Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that a pri-
vate Title IX damages action could lie against a board of education
and its employees in a case involving peer sexual harassment.4 The
Court reasoned that when the Monroe County School Board was de-
liberately indifferent to the misconduct of a student and possessed ac-
* Michele Goodwin, J.D., Boston College Law School; LL.M., University of Wisconsin Law
School; SJD, University of Wisconsin Law School (anticipated 2004). The author wishes to
thank the DePaul University Law Review, and particularly Mary Ann Becker, the editor for the
symposium edition. I am grateful to Tulani Grundy for outstanding research assistance and help
with collecting, compiling, and desegregating data on sexual harassment in the public school
setting. I also owe my deepest gratitude to Stephanie Crawdus for tireless research assistance
and commitment to furthering educational opportunities for young women. This article is dedi-
cated in memory of Stephanie Crawdus, Jerry Devine, and Benny Bibbs.
1. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that private damages
actions may lie against a school board in cases of peer sexual harassment under Title IX where
the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its pro-
grams or activities).
3. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger Than Others, WASH. PosT, July 4,
1999, at B4; Cynthia Gorney, Teaching Johnny the Appropriate Way to Flirt, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1999, at 43; Ruth D. Raisfeld, Analysis of Supreme Court Rulings on Student Sexual Harassment
Cases, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1999, at 1: Mary Leonard, Schools Can Be Liable If Pupils Harass: Su-
preme Court Rules on Suits, BosTON GLOBE, May 25, 1999, at Al; Paul Ruffins, A Guiding
Insight, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Feb. 18. 1999, at 24; Jennifer J. Hamilton, School
Board May Be Liable For Student-On-Student Sexual Harassment, CONNECTICUT EMPLOYMENT
LAW LEI-rER, July, 1999 (Vol. 7, Issue 7).
4. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641.
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tual knowledge of his severe misconduct, a private action brought by
the victim's mother on her daughter's behalf could survive judicial
scrutiny.5
In its first attempt to define the parameters and scope of this ruling,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the harassment must be sufficiently
concrete, thereby depriving the victim access to the educational bene-
fits offered by the school. 6 The Supreme Court further held, as
demonstrated in Davis, the misconduct must be pervasive, severe, and
objectively offensive. 7 Although the Davis case does not establish a
strict test for peer sexual harassment, it nevertheless appears to have
set a standard by which lower courts must abide. In fact, commenta-
tors have credited the opinion for providing guidance to school
districts.
Davis ushers in a new era for the Court because it is the first Su-
preme Court decision that provides for damages against an educa-
tional institution for failing to address peer sexual harassment since
Congress passed the Title IX Educational Amendments of 1972.8
Peer harassment is often minimized or overlooked entirely; 9 however,
cases involving teacher-student sexual harassment are perceived as
clearly objectionable.t" In fact, many legal scholars would agree that a
teacher who creates a hostile environment through his or her sexual
harassment of students compromises an educational opportunity for
those students.' I However, courts, as well as individual commenta-
tors, have been split on the issue as to students. 12
5. Id. at 652 (noting that "damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-
calling among school children").
6. Id. at 654.
7. Id. at 653. See also, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
8. 20 U.S.C. §1681 (a) (2001). Title IX provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
9. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
10. See Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 (2001) (holding school district showed deliberate
indifference to teacher's sexual harassment of student and causing constitutional injury); P.H. v.
School Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653 (2001); See also, Greg Barret, Schools Redraw The
Sexual Lines: Teacher-Student Sex Has More Attention, But Few Solutions, USA TODAY, Sept. 6,
2001, at D10; Terri L. Regotti, Negligent Hiring and Retaining of Sexually Abusive Teachers, 73
Eouc. L. REP. 333 (1992); Eric J. Kuperman, The Mark of Cain: No Second Chance for Teachers
Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Students, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 491 (1996).
11. See Kuperman, supra note 10, at 512.
12. See Vance v. Spencer County Public School Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (2000) (holding that school
district had subjected student to intentional sexual discrimination inviolation of Title IX as a
result of peer harassment); Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d. 1238 (1999) (plaintiff mother
successfully showed that school district officials were knowledgeable and indifferent to the sex-
ual harassment experienced by her daughter). But see, Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Ed., 94
[Vol. 51:805
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Prior to Davis, the Court had only defined the contours of a right to
be free from teacher-student sex discrimination at both secondary and
higher education institutions.13 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,
the Court established that Congress intended for Title IX to allow for
private causes of action relating to sex discrimination at federally
funded institutions.14  More recently, in both Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public School and Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, which involved sexual harassment claims brought against high
school teachers, the Court further outlined the standard for reviewing
Title IX sexual harassment causes of action. These cases failed to pro-
vide guidance for, or perhaps did not contemplate, peer sexual harass-
ment claims under Title IX.
Davis broadens the scope of Title IX's applicability to cases involv-
ing sex discrimination in educational institutions that receive federal
funding. Here, the Court opined that a recipient of federal funds in-
tentionally violates the spirit and intent of Title IX by denying a stu-
dent the benefits of education or subjecting a student to
discrimination in any educational program. Commentators have sug-
gested that Davis is one of the most important education cases in the
twentieth century. 15 The case marks a turning point in the American
F. Supp. 2d 447 (2000); C.R.K. v. U.S.D. 260, 76 F. Supp. 2d. 1145 (2001): KF's Father v. Marri-
ott, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2534 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2001).
13. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (establishing precedent by interpret-
ing Title IX to allow for private right causes of action in sex discrimination cases); Franklin v.
Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (establishing a remedy under Title IX for teacher-
student sexual harassment where a teacher subjected a high school student to continuous sexual
harassment through overtures in class and intercourse in his office); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (further defining the protection offered by Title IX for teacher-
student sexual harassment, establishing the deliberate indifference and actual notice
requirements).
14. See e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95 (comparing Title IX with Title VI, which allows for a
private cause of action in race discrimination cases).
15. See Ruffins, supra note 3. at 24 (noting the importance of studying the case for its signifi-
cant racial and ethical implications); see also, Verna L. Williams, A New Harassment Ruling:
Implications for Colleges, THE CHRON. OF HIcHER EDUC.. June 18, 1999, at A56 (suggesting that
colleges and universities can learn "plenty" from "a legal case about two fifth-graders in an
elementary school," urging that the decision was a "wake-up call to the nation's educational
institutions"); Margo L. Ely, Students Win Narrow Protection in Narrow Victory, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., June 14, 1999, at 5 (noting that it had "been more than 30 years since Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits sex discrimination in employment," and that it
took nearly 25 years for the United States Supreme Court to hold "that the protection in educa-
tional programs includes the right to be free from sex harassment by other students").
While many consider the case to be significant for the precedent it sets, not all commentators
are pleased with the ultimate holding in Davis. Among those who have criticized the judicial
reasoning are advocates for young women, girls, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who claim that the
standard established in Davis is too high. For a discussion of this particular perspective, see
Lynne Bernabei, A Standard Set Too High; Instead of Triggering Suits, Georgia Title IX Ruling
Raises Threshold, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 20, 1999.
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social conscious and creates precedent in civil rights, education, and
feminist jurisprudence. 16
Although peer sexual harassment has been pervasive, intense, and
well documented in at least two often-cited studies, 17 school adminis-
trators traditionally have overlooked or dismissed such misconduct as
insensitive and immature but harmless behavior.' 8 Jacqueline Woods,
the Executive Director of the American Association of University
Women, remarks that "sexual harassment is part of everyday life for
boys and girls at school."'19 Comments such as "boys will be boys"
often punctuate the victim's interaction with the seemingly disinter-
ested school administration.20 Even Justice Antonin Scalia pointed
out during oral arguments for the Davis case that "little girls always
tease little boys and little boys always tease little girls," noting that
such behavior is not uncommon and perhaps echoing the sentiment of
school administrators.2'
This Article argues that a broader understanding of sexual conduct
among youth in America's public schools is needed to create more
effective legal, ethical, and public policy responses. It suggests that
sexual harassment in the public school setting must be viewed with a
Others have staunchly criticized the narrow majority ruling in the case, comparing the Court's
holding to inappropriate and misguided judicial activism and suggesting that children's behaviors
cannot be compared with that of adults, as children lack the knowledge and maturity to distin-
guish right from wrong. See Mark Hamblett, Judge Blasts School Harassment Case, THE NAT'L
L. J., May 1, 2000, at A9 (quoting Judge McMahon as saying, "Davis is classic example of the old
law school maxim that "bad facts make bad law").
16. See Williams, supra note 15, at A56.
17. See e.g., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found. ed., 2001) [hereinafter AAUW
SURVEY 11] and its predecessor; HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Educ. Found. ed., 2001) [herein-
after AAUW SURVEY I].
18. Id. See also, Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (petitioners claiming that they were regularly sexually harassed by
peers and informed school officials who failed to respond); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830
F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted, 949 F. Supp.
1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (student arguing that school counselor failed to appropriately respond to
her pleas to intervene and stop the alleged peer harassment).
19. See comments of Jacqueline Woods regarding the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in
America's public schools and the 2001 AAUW Survey 11 at http://www.aauw.org/2000/hos-
tile.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2002).
20. See Jehan A. Abdel-Gawad. Kiddie Sex Harassment: How Title IX Could Level The Play-
ing Field Without Leveling The Playground, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 731 (1997) (citing Todd
Woody, School Counselor Entitled to Immunity, Court Says, RECORDER, May 15, 1995, at 3; Jim
Herron Zamora, Ex-Student Can't Sue Counselor over Harassment, S.F. EXAMINER, May 13,
1995, at A3).
21. Supreme Court Transcript at 3, Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
(No. 97-843).
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clear understanding about how America's public schools operate.
This requires reading Davis in context with practical considerations,
while acknowledging and addressing the traumatic, often life-long ef-
fects of bullying, sexual harassment, and sexual abuse. While ulti-
mately correctly decided, Davis is a potentially problematic holding in
that what it seems to grant is ultimately more illusory than real. The
case itself may not necessarily cure inappropriate sexual conduct in
America's public schools, but rather may result in increased criminal
complaints filed against elementary and middle school students by
school administrators concerned about possible litigation.
The scope of this paper is intentionally narrow and, thus, may raise
more questions for further consideration by the author or colleagues
interested in the topic. It addresses four issues. First, Part II ad-
dresses the facts in Davis, giving voice to LaShonda's experience. Part
III uses the judicial precedent set in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education and its progeny to discuss the merits and drawbacks of judi-
cial intervention in sexual harassment incidents among youth. Part IV
analyzes the psychological impact of sexual harassment on youth and
the long and short-term psychological effects of sexual violence. Fi-
nally, Part V suggests alternative intervention models to address sex-
ual harassment in the public school setting.
II. JUDICIAL REMEDY AND THE POWER OF STICKS, STONES,
AND WORDS ...
Ideas are powerful shapers of behavior. No idea has had graver
consequences than this: one group is superior to another by nature.
Most societies have been built on the bedrock of that idea. It has
been the basis for racism, sexism, nationalism, imperialism, and
speciesism. 22
LaShonda's Story: The Victim's Narrative
LaShonda Davis was an intelligent, eager-to-learn, and enthusiastic
Hubbard Elementary School student.23 She was a star student, earned
high grades, and was considered a leader among her peers. 24 How-
ever, in the fall of 1992, Hubbard Elementary School, located in
22. See EMILIE BUCHWALD, RAISING GIRLS FOR THE 21" CENTURY IN TRANSFORMING A
RAPE CULTURE 179, 183 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993).
23. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1999) (noting LaShonda's previ-
ously high grades before the sexual harassment began).
24. Id. at 635.
2002]
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Monroe County, Georgia, became a place of considerable distress and
anxiety for her.2 5
Although only in fifth grade, LaShonda was unable to sleep,
showed signs of depression, and lost the ability to concentrate. 26 She
became weepy and frustrated, and she was unable to approach Hub-
bard Elementary School, particularly her fifth grade class. The little
girl who had once seemed confident, communicative, and cheerful
suddenly feared going to school. Her apprehensiveness and tension
were noticed at home and school;27 LaShonda's performance in school
declined, her previously high grades fell, and in the spring of 1993, her
father discovered a suicide note.28 Barely eleven years old, Miss Da-
vis, an African-American little girl, had lost the desire to live and go
to school.29
According to the Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion, beginning in the late fall of 1992 and continuing through the
spring of 1993, LaShonda was the victim of a classmate's (G.F.) severe
and persistent misconduct, including objectively vulgar comments,
groping, and touching. 30 Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor noted that the harassment began with G.F.'s attempts to
touch LaShonda's genital area and breasts.3 1 Vulgar comments and
lewd suggestions, such as "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want
to feel your boobs," accompanied his unwelcome physical advances
and culminated into more direct and open displays of sexual harass-
ment, often in the classroom. 32
Over a five month period, G.F. continued to harass LaShonda in a
similar fashion, but the harassment escalated to include rubbing
against her body in the hallway and more overt in-class misconduct. 33
Each incident, according to the petitioner's complaint, was promptly
reported to LaShonda's classroom teachers, including Whit Maples,
25. Id. See also Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1t, Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
(No. 97-843) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief] (noting how sexual harassment interferes "with a
student's academic performance and emotional and physical well-being").
26. See e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 635.
27. Id. at 634-35.
28. Id. at 634 (referring to communications between LaShonda and her parents, where she
told them she "didn't know how much longer she could keep [him] off her").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 632-33. According to the Davis complaint, LaShonda was not the only victim of
persistent sexual harassment by G.F. The complaint alleged that his misconduct extended to
other fifth grade girls, who also complained to the teachers and attempted to share their discon-
tent with Bill Querry, the Hubbard Elementary School principal. Id. at 635.
31. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (citing Petitioner's Complaint).
32. Id. (quoting Petitioner's Complaint, at 7).
33. Id. at 634.
[Vol. 51:805
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Diane Fort, and Joyce Pippin, and efforts were made to meet with the
principal. 34 However, when LaShonda attempted to meet with Hub-
bard Elementary School principal Bill Querry, she was told by a
teacher that "if [Querry] wants you, he'll call you." 35
After an incident wherein G.F. placed a doorstop in his pants and
approached LaShonda in a sexually suggestive manner during a physi-
cal education class, she again reported the conduct to her classroom
teacher and her mother.36 Her mother followed up, as she had with
each of the previous incidents that LaShonda informed her about, by
calling the teacher in whose class the harassment occurred. 37 Accord-
ing to LaShonda, these incidents all occurred at Hubbard Elementary
School during school hours, often in class or immediately after, and
under the gaze of teachers and school administrators. When
LaShonda's mother confronted Principal Querry five months after the
initial incident of sexual harassment to ask when disciplinary action
would take place, she was informed that maybe he would "have to
threaten [G.F.] a little bit harder. '38
Even moving LaShonda to another classroom seemed to have been
too much to ask of the Hubbard Elementary School faculty and ad-
ministration, as efforts were not made to move either G.F. or
LaShonda.39 "On the contrary," wrote Justice O'Connor, "notwith-
standing LaShonda's frequent complaints, only after more than three
months of reported harassment was she even permitted to change her
classroom seat so that she was no longer seated next to G.F.
' 40
The harassment came to an abrupt end shortly after Mrs. Davis'
final attempt to resolve the question of G.F.'s discipline with Principal
Querry. G.F. never denied that his behavior was extremely inappro-
priate or demeaning. The problem, as it appears, was that he was
never disciplined. It was at this time that G.F. "was charged with, and
pleaded guilty to, sexual battery for his misconduct." 41
Sadly, at the conclusion of her fifth grade year, LaShonda was not
the only victim of the school's failure to address sexual violence in its
school; other victims included G.F. and the other girls whom he had
harassed. LaShonda and the other young women were the obvious
34. Id.
35. Id. at 635 (quoting Petitioner's Complaint, at 10).
36. Id. at 634.
37. Davis, 526 U.S. at 634.
38. Id. at 635. According to the Petitioner's complaint, Querry asked why LaShonda "was the
only one complaining." Id. (quoting Petitioner's Complaint, at 12).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
2002]
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victims. 42 LaShonda's grades, self-esteem, and confidence (not only in
herself but also her teachers) were horribly compromised during her
five-month battle. However, the school district's failure to act, edu-
cate, and promote an equitable learning environment also ultimately
hurt G.F. Perhaps, had he been disciplined and clearly told what the
district would not tolerate, he could have conformed his behavior to
appropriate school conduct. The Monroe County Board of Educa-
tion's deliberate indifference to his known acts of harassment left G.F.
without guidance and ultimately resulted in an introduction to the
criminal justice system, caused students to lose confidence in the
school system, and severely compromised LaShonda's ability to re-
ceive an education.
In a Title IX claim later filed in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia, LaShonda and her mother claimed
that her depression and anxiety were the direct result of severe and
persistent peer sexual harassment.43 According to the Davis family,
despite "a string" of reports from the victim and her mother, school
administrators and the principal failed to take corrective actions to
stop the harassment and, therefore, failed to act responsibly. 4 Their
complaints to teachers and ultimately the principal seemed to fall on
deaf ears.45
On May 4, 1994, LaShonda's mother filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the Board,
the school district's superintendent, and the school's principal, alleg-
ing several things. First, the complaint alleged that the Board was a
recipient of federal funds and, thus, subject to the requirements of
Title IX. Second, it alleged "that the persistent sexual advances and
harassment by [G.F.] upon [LaShonda] interfered with her ability to
attend school and perform her studies and activities. '46 Third, the
complaint alleged that the deliberate indifference by the Monroe
County School Board created an environment that was hostile, intimi-
dating, abusive, and offensive in violation of Title IX, which protects
one's right to equal access at educational institutions receiving federal
funds.47
42. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635 (noting that LaShonda was accompanied by other girls who had
been harassed by G.F. when she called upon the Mr. Querry to file a complaint).
43. Id.
44. In the spring of 1994, Aurelia Davis, LaShonda's mother, filed suit against the Board,
Charles Dumas, the school district's superintendent, and Principal Querry. Id. at 635-36.
45. Id. at 634.
46. Id. at 636.
47. Id.
[Vol. 51:805
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III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION, DISTRICT RESPONSE, &
UNEXPECTED OUTCOMES
One must meaningfully study Davis in context with America's cul-
tural climate 48 and, more specifically, that of our schools49 to truly
understand its significance for cases yet to come. Are we willing as a
culture to explore the meanings of sex and sexual harassment and
treat them as concepts necessary for our children to understand?
When are children to be approached about these topics, and what
kinds of discussion have we deemed appropriate? Davis is a complex
case that raises questions about appropriate standards of review, the
ideal plaintiff, school boards as defendants, and the unsophisticated
harasser.
Should there be a reasonable child standard? What consideration
should be given to the plaintiff child who is more sensitive or less con-
fident; does the defendant harasser take the victim as he sees her?
What if the harassment were of the nature that most other students
would not find offensive? What type of evidence does a plaintiff need
to show to have a successful cause of action? Should zero tolerance
be the appropriate response by school districts? These questions ad-
dress both legal and public policy concerns and warrant public discus-
sion to determine how the Court's holding will affect school districts
and students throughout the United States.
48. Exploring America's cultural climate would necessarily involve examining what signifi-
cance or value has historically been given to discussing sex and sexual harassment. Historically,
sex as well as sexual abuse, and harassment experienced by the vulnerable, whether men or
women, was given limited space for discussion in the broader social context. See e.g., EMILIE
BUCHWALD ET AL., TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE (1993) (discussing sexual violence and
its origins in American culture).
Likewise, the intersection of race and sexual violence was generally ignored or treated as
insignificant, as women of color, especially black women and girls, were, at a time, by law re-
duced to the status of chattel and often compared to field animals. In popular literature, the
features of black women and little girls were often exaggerated (bulging eyes, rotund torso,
overwhelming lips), operating to make these women seem undesirable and lacking "per-
sonhood" and the right to consent or refuse sexual overtures. By making these women and girls
undesirable or outcasts in the public sphere (as is the case with most forms of bullying), aggres-
sions against their bodies were automatically defensible. Either she asked for it, deserved it, or
should have been happy that she got it. Indeed, black women and girls were often the unac-
knowledged victims of sexual aggression by white, as well as black, men. See e.g., CATHERINE
CLINTON & MICHELE GILLESPIE, THE DEVIL'S LANE: SEX AND RACE IN THE EARLY SOUTH
(1997) (critiquing America's race denial with regard to the sexual harassment and abuse of Black
girls and women); PAMELA HAAG, CONSENT, SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1999).
49. See e.g., PATRICIA DONOVAN, SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA'S SCHOOL: PROFESS AND OB-
STACLES IN EDUCATION (Fred Schultz ed., 1994).
2002]
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The Supreme Court's decision in Davis has been criticized on and
off the bench.50 Ironically, those most troubled by the Davis decision
represent different ideological perspectives. The case has attracted
criticism from both liberal and conservative women and women's
groups. Some commentators argue that the Court stopped short of
creating an equitable standard in peer sexual harassment cases by im-
posing a strict and overly burdensome standard.51 Lynne Bernabei
questions why the dissent in Davis decried the majority's opinion
when the standard established, as she suggests, is "exceedingly
high."'52 She suggests that, contrary to predictions about Davis open-
ing the floodgates of frivolous litigation, the decision will have a chil-
ling effect. 53
Others suggest that the Court erred by placing a burden on schools
to address sexual misconduct, thereby not only taking these issues out
of parents' hands but also exposing school districts to potential liabil-
ity that Congress could not have foreseen nor anticipated with Title
IX. Judges are also weary of the Davis decision. 54 In their dissent,
Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy
criticized the majority for applying an overly broad and liberal stan-
dard in their interpretation of Title IX. The dissenting Justices sug-
gested, "[O]nly if States receive clear notice of the conditions attached
to federal funds can they guard against excessive federal intrusion into
state affairs and be vigilant in policing the boundaries of federal
power. ' 55 To read the provisions of Title IX in full, they suggested, is
to learn that it does not explicitly create a private cause of action.56
Shortly after the Davis decision, Judge Colleen McMahon publicly
lamented the overwhelmng "flood" of litigation triggered by the
Court's decision. 57 In Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Board of Education,
considered part of the Davis progeny, McMahon's discontent with the
Davis ruling is hardly concealed. While she recognized the harms ex-
perienced by the victim in Davis, she forewarned that the Court's
holding inevitably would be applied to lawsuits with far less "heinous
behavior. ' 58 In her opinion, allowing private causes of action to stand
50. See Hamblett, supra note 15, at A9 (quoting Judge McMahon).
51. See Bernabei, supra note 15 (citation omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id. (asserting that "it is much more likely that Davis will have the opposite effect-reduc-
ing the number of federal suits brought by sexually harassed or abused students").
54. See Hamblett, supra note 15, at A9 (quoting Judge McMahon).
55. Davis, 526 U.S. at 655.
56. Id. But see Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (creating an implied private
cause of action in sex discrimination cases).
57. See e.g., Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 447 (2000).
58. Id.
[Vol. 51:805
SEX, THEORY, & PRACTICE
against school districts that are deliberately indifferent to allegations
of peer sexual harassment spurred a surge of litigation that lower
courts were responsible for addressing. 59 According to McMahon,
"Davis is a classic example of the old law school maxim that 'bad facts
make bad law."' 60
Accordingly, Judge McMahon granted summary judgment to the
Mount Vernon Board of Education in Manfredi, where a second grade
student alleged peer sexual harassment. 61 Judge McMahon opined
that the school system was not held liable under Title IX for the teas-
ing and physical abuse of an elementary school girl by a male class-
mate, where the sole allegation of "sexual harassment" centered on
the boy touching Manfredi's "private spot."'62 As a matter of law, she
reasoned, the acts in Manfredi did not rise to those witnessed in Davis.
In fact, the court asserted that the second grade aggressor's acts
were not "sexual harassment at all."' 63 Taking great pains to distin-
guish Davis, McMahon suggested that teasing, shoving, kicking, push-
ing, poking, and mean conduct can be hurtful, but they are hardly
sexual harassment. 64  Moreover, she concluded that the Mount
Vernon Board of Education presented a more persuasive defense.
The school board pleaded that efforts were taken to limit the har-
asser's contact with the victim by moving her to another classroom
where her grades improved and she seemed more successful, demon-
strating that they were not deliberately indifferent to the acts of an
"unruly boy" or the complaints of a "sensitive girl."' 65
The problem, as some view the holding in Davis, is that frivolous
law suits will overwhelm the courts, and behavior that is viewed as
reasonable childlike conduct could be conflated with more serious acts
of unchecked "heinous" sexual aggression. 66 But whose definition of
heinous should determine the outcome of peer sexual harassment
cases? Moreover, is it not the courts' role to settle disputes and allow
the aggrieved to seek justice, recourse, and remedies?
59. Id. (suggesting that "despite the best efforts of the Supreme Court to restrict its reach,
Davis will inevitably be applied to justify lawsuits over far less heinous behavior-like this
one").
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
64. Id.
65. Id. See also, Mark Hamblett, Judge Blasts School Harassment Case, THE NAT'L L.J., May
1, 2000, at A9. (quoting Judge McMahon's attack on Davis v. Monroe and her fear that courts
will be overwhelmed with peer sexual harassment cases).
66. Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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Other issues remain unclear as to future sexual harassment victims.
Is LaShonda's case the best example of a Title IX violation? What if
her mother had filed the suit prior to G.F. pleading guilty to sexual
battery; would the case have been less persuasive to the majority? At
what point did G.F.'s behavior become heinous, or were each of his
actions heinous and the matter was simply an issue of pervasiveness
over time? Finally, at what point did the school administrators' con-
duct unquestionably meet the deliberate indifference standard?
Ultimately, Davis was correctly decided because Title IX makes
clear that it is a school district's responsibility to maintain an environ-
ment that will provide equal access to students if it is a recipient of
federal funds. Title IX requires, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. '67 The district abrogated its obligation to abide by the Ti-
tle IX requirements. The school board itself failed to meet several
Title IX requirements, including failing to hire or appoint a Title IX
coordinator or officer who would advise on situations such as those at
Hubbard Elementary School. 68 As an agent of the school board, the
principal failed to carry out his duties responsibly by neglecting to in-
vestigate LaShonda's allegations, meet with the parents involved, and
discipline the offender. By acting in a callous and disinterested man-
ner, the principal exposed the district to liability. Thus, it was not
G.F.'s behavior in isolation that led to the Davis decision but rather
the school district's lack of action in a known case in which a student
was being deprived an educational opportunity by someone within the
school's reach.
The Davis case finally gave visibility to a serious problem in
America's public schools. However, the Court's lack of guidance
poses a problem for future cases. The case could have the unintended
effect of spurring criminal law suits brought not by the victim or his/
her parents against fellow elementary and middle school students but
by teachers and administrators as a way of addressing misconduct by
particular students. Judge McMahon suggests that the conduct exhib-
ited by G.F. was criminal, but she distinguishes it from the conduct of
a boy who touched a seven-year-old girl's "private parts" and in nine
67. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2001).
68. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 635 (noting also that the district had failed to instruct its employees
about sexual harassment and failed to develop and post a policy about sex discrimination and
sexual harassment).
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different instances knocked her down on the playground.69 But how
will school administrators decide what is criminal and who are the
criminals? Unfortunately, as exhibited in some school districts, fear of
being personally named in a peer sexual harassment lawsuit could
lead principals to call the police first and ask questions later.
Is criminalizing sexual misconduct among elementary and middle
school students the correct response? Arguably, the answer would be
no, as it flies in the face of public policy and is inherently misguided to
subject broad groups of children, many of whom may be unwise about
the significant harms associated with their behaviors, to the criminal
justice system. Schools have mechanisms at their disposal for address-
ing student misconduct, including one-on-one communication, calling
parents, counseling, and disciplinary alternatives, such as detentions,
in-school suspensions, out-of-school suspensions, and expulsion. My
concern here is that sexual harassment is pervasive at the elementary
and middle school levels. Criminalizing the conduct will not stop the
behavior. Moreover, inconsistencies based on race, socioeconomic
status, family status, and even local geography are inevitable.
In addition, a rush to court addresses neither the victim's trauma
nor the cultural climate in schools wherein sexual misconduct fre-
quently occurs. Peer sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in
America's schools; however, it is not well documented. While G.F.'s
behavior may seem shocking to some, it is not outside of what has
become the normative cultural environment of elementary and middle
schools. While teachers, principals, and other school administrators
realize this, rarely are parents brought to understand the nature and
extent of their children's sexual conduct in schools. Unfortunately,
most parents find out too late.
For this reason, criticism of the Davis approach for failing to ad-
dress the devastating impact of sexual harassment on the bullied vic-
tim, as well as the potential for inequitable knee-jerk responses to its
holding, should not be ignored. The Davis Court did not address the
trauma associated with frequently reporting and possibly documenting
obvious, pervasive acts of sexual misconduct that the Court would
seem to require. Furthermore, it appears that unless a student zeal-
ously advocates on her own behalf like a tenacious lawyer, providing
notice after each incident, the knowledge prong of the Davis analysis
will not be fulfilled. Indeed, it appears that even if a school district
was put on notice, its minimal actions to acknowledge the problematic
behavior would seem to overcome the deliberate indifference stan-
69. Manfredi, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
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dard (i.e., if a desk were moved or an interview in the principal's of-
fice were held).
A practical approach should be embraced to address peer sexual
harassment. Such an approach would include mandatory professional
development training for teachers, age-appropriate sexual harassment
workshops for students, and greater involvement and accountability
among Title IX officers in school districts.
IV. UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment became popularly known in the social and politi-
cal context as arising in the workplace. Early sexual harassment law-
suits were and continue to be brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits abuse of power characterized by
manipulation, unwanted sexual attention, coercion, threats of punish-
ment for failure to acquiesce to sexual favors, and the creation of a
hostile environment. The courts have recognized two forms of sexual
harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment.
A. Quid Pro Quo
Quid pro quo sexual harassment is that which literally translates to
"this for that." It usually occurs when a teacher, supervisor, or profes-
sor makes an academic or professional decision based on the victim's
willingness to comply with requests for sexual favors. It also occurs
when sexual abuse is a term or condition of being a student or em-
ployee. It can be used either as a threat of punishment for failure to
comply or as a reward for fulfilling the harasser's desire.
B. Hostile Environment
On the other hand, the hostile environment prong of Title VII ad-
dresses the existence of patterns of behaviors that are sexual in nature
and create an impediment to performance. Sexual in nature includes
not only sexual advances but also demeaning comments, jokes, touch-
ing, notes, e-mails, and gestures. It is possible, in fact likely, that a
hostile environment is created when one is subject to quid pro quo
sexual harassment.
C. Sex, Culture, & Harm
The deleterious effect of sexual harassment to a young and eager
learner has been compared to that of racism, which was addressed by
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the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.70 The damage
that can be caused by racial slurs and epithets in the American lexi-
con, along with threats of bodily harm, would seem clear to most as
creating an impediment in the learning process. Active racial miscon-
duct targeted at another student and ignored by the administration
certainly compromises the harassed individual's educational opportu-
nities. This has been widely recognized within the American political,
legislative, and judicial process and seems commonly understood
within our sociocultural context. Although ever present in American
culture, acts of racism are generally understood, for the most part, to
be taboo.
However, sexual harassment does not carry the same presence or
meaning within our social understanding. While racism is understood
to be an irrational, hatred-based reaction to one's genetic or biological
markers (i.e., skin color or ethnicity), sexual harassment often is inter-
preted as something having less to do with one's genetic status (i.e.,
male or female) than one's behavior. 71 Race, on the other hand, is
something we can perceive as "out of one's control." It is immutable,
unchangeable, and fixed. For example, one is not black because he or
she engaged in questionable or immoral acts.
However, sexually harassing taunts generally attempt to degrade
the victim in two distinct ways. The first way that behavior association
manifests itself is by associating the victim with a particularly demean-
ing image that is also associated with certain behaviors. For example,
calling the student victim a "prostitute," "trick," "slut," "ho," or
"whore" calls to mind images that carry powerful social connotations.
Indeed, these are images that most young women would least like to
be associated with, as they suggest that (1) sex can be bought from the
victim, (2) she engages in morally questionable sexual behaviors, and
(3) she has questionable "values."
The second way in which verbal sexual harassment can manifest it-
self is through taunts that characterize the victim as engaging in sexu-
ally deviant behaviors. For example, bathroom graffiti that portrays
the victim as "available" or "easy" and suggests that she "can do two
at a time" or "sucks all night long" demonstrates this concept quite
clearly. Furthermore, it underscores how sexual harassment can be an
attack on one's sense of values, moral integrity, and conduct, causing
one to wonder how she may have contributed to the sexual
harassment.
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. See e.g., Gorney, supra note 3, at 43 (quoting a victim of peer sexual harassment as won-
dering "What's wrong with me?").
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Cynthia Gorney writes about the experiences of Katy Lyle, upon
whom an ABC movie for television was based. The harassment in-
volved graffiti, which remained in the boys bathroom of her Duluth
high school for sixteen months, that characterized Katy as a "slut" and
contained "pornographic references to dogs, to farm animals, [and] to
Katy engaging in sexual relations with her brother." 72 Katy was dev-
astated as classmates began to whisper about her and tease her in the
halls. 73
Katy and her parents confronted the high school principal who
failed to take action to remove the slurs from the bathroom walls. His
response was that "boys will be boys."' 74 Katy was devastated by the
graffiti, remembering that "it took my breath away... I just burst into
tears. ' 75 However, most devastating for Katy, as she recalled in an
interview, was the high school administration's failure to take her case
seriously. According to Katy, their failure to act eventually made her
question whether she had somehow contributed to maltreatment by
her peers. Perhaps for this reason, victims of sexual abuse, whether
committed by peers, family members, or strangers, are reluctant to
confront their harassers, report cases of harassment, file criminal
charges, or seek civil damages. 76
In the school context, these forms of labeling can have a more per-
nicious effect than even workplace sexual harassment. In situations
involving workplace sexual harassment, one can ask for a transfer
within the company, leave the place of employment, or pursue an in-
ternal grievance procedure if available. However, students are
trapped; they must go to school, and transferring (even if to another
class) can be virtually impossible.
Sadly, a common response to sexual harassment is to peer into the
victim's life and question what she or he did to warrant such treatment
or simply dismiss the misconduct as insignificant, meaningless, or all in
the spirit of fun. Our cultural position on sexual harassment has con-
tributed to the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace
and in schools. While a growing body of case law has established that
sexual harassment can be costly in the workplace, only recently have
elementary, middle, and high school cases of sexual harassment
wound their way through the judicial system.
72. See Gorney, supra note 3, at 43.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Katy Lyle).
76. See e.g., BUCHWALD, supra note 22; see also, HAAG, supra note 48.
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Recent studies conducted among parents and school officials in
southern school districts have revealed that most parents and school
board members seem to be unaware of the extent to which sexual
misconduct occurs in schools and its severity. 77 More than likely, this
is not a southern phenomenon, and parents throughout the United
States may be unaware of the breadth of issues confronting their chil-
dren in America's public schools.7 8
From 1996-2000, my research group conducted studies on sexual
harassment in middle schools located in southern school districts.
These studies included interviewing parents, students, teachers, princi-
pals, and school board officials, as well as conducting focus groups,
workshops, and professional development training sessions for teach-
ers. The empirical data collection involved conducting over two hun-
dred workshops with middle school students to learn about their
perceptions relating to sexual harassment. Data gathering also in-
cluded meeting with parents who are often overlooked in studies of
this nature, most notably African-American parents in inner-city
communities.79
Our research revealed that school board members were often una-
ware of the extent to which sexual harassment was prevalent in their
districts. While they knew offensive behaviors were a part of the cul-
tural climate of schools, they often were naive about the pervasive
nature of the problem. Also, our research revealed that the behaviors
crossed racial, socioeconomic, and gender social constructions. Thus,
from the inner-city schools to those in more elite subdivided areas,
sexual harassment was pronounced and intense. Parents were not
necessarily unaware of the problem, particularly if their children were
the targets of harassment.
77. The original impetus for the study involved studying the high incidence of students of
color being over-identified into special education programs. Data at the time indicated a link
between special education and entrance into the criminal justice system. This often involved
students being charged by their teachers with crimes such as "terroristic threatening" for making
inappropriate comments, including calling their teachers "bitch," "whore," or "cunt." Over the
course of four years, over two hundred workshops were conducted with middle school students
to determine, among other things, their understanding of sexual harassment and the frequency
of it at their particular schools.
78. See e.g., Gorney, supra note 3 (discussing how the mother of a Minnesota school girl
"burst into tears" when she learned about the sexual harassment that her daughter had been
encountering for nearly two years). Parents seem most concerned and disappointed, however,
by school administrators' lack of action to remedy the misconduct.
79. These interviews and focus groups in inner-city communities were done with the assistance
of local boards of health and community leaders. Often conducted in low-income housing com-
munities, these workshops were informative and well received by the parents.
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Clearly, parents are aware that schooling one's child is not what it
used to be; however, the challenge seems to be in recognizing that
children as young as seven or eight years old are engaging in behav-
iors that would be unacceptable in America's workplaces. School
board members and parents may be reluctant to acknowledge that
America's schools are social microcosms even at the elementary
school level. This oversight perhaps could be related to parents' un-
willingness to see how behaviors witnessed in the home or viewed on
television are carried into the classroom. Acknowledging that sexual
harassment in the public school setting also means a loss of the myth
of innocence. As one school board member told me in response to my
suggestion that middle school students should receive sexual harass-
ment training, "But they are only babies!"
V. FRAMING APPROPRIATE RESPONSES
Sexual harassment has not been taken seriously as a cultural phe-
nomenon, particularly in the context of schools and among students.
Bullying, interpreted more often as one more aggressive or larger
young male dominating the weaker male, has received much more at-
tention in the popular media and in scholarship than peer sexual har-
assment in the public school setting.
Davis does not necessarily teach us what the appropriate legal re-
sponse to peer sexual harassment might be. In an effort to achieve
balance, the United States Supreme Court casts the case in limbo, cre-
ating a remedy for LaShonda Davis that places all school districts that
receive federal funding on alert that unchecked peer sexual harass-
ment could result in a successful private damages action against the
district and its employees."" However, the threshold requirements,
which happen to be stricter than those imposed in cases of teacher-
student sexual harassment, could be perceived as almost insurmounta-
ble.81 What is to be done?
80. See Williams, supra note 15 (noting that "Davis makes clear that institutions can be re-
quired to pay damages under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits
sex discrimination in federally supported education . . .".). See also, KF's Father v. Marriott,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2534 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2001) (finding that the plaintiff suffered severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harassment but failed to demonstrate that defendants
were deliberately indifferent); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (suggesting that a flood of frivolous lawsuits will result from the Davis case).
81. See Bernabei, supra note 15 (citation omitted) (suggesting that the Supreme Court "cre-
ated a new and onerous standard of liability"). See also, Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of
Educ., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447 (2000) (granting summary judgment to the Mount Vernon Board of
Education and its officials).
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Ultimately, the answers to peer sexual harassment are not found in
the courts. While relief may be found for the immediate victim (often
years after the incidents occur), others are left to deal with an unfortu-
nate cultural climate that perpetuates itself. This is particularly true
for elementary and middle schools, where classes on sexual responsi-
bility often are not taught or are taught by teachers who admit their
limited knowledge and skill in effectively teaching students what they
need to know.
First, sexual harassment must be acknowledged as a pervasive and
persistent problem in America's public schools. Second, once ac-
cepted as a problem, stakeholders who will help to articulate a solu-
tion must be identified. Often, key people who could address
problems such as sexual harassment are left out of the process, includ-
ing school guidance counselors, parents, and the students themselves.
Third, teachers must have professional development training that will
inform them about Title IX, Title VI, and Title VII. They also must be
aware of their potential liability as an agent of the school for failing to
address pervasive, persistent, and concrete forms of sexual harassment
and violence in their classrooms and hallways. Fourth, students must
be trained. Our workshops and focus groups with boys and girls
proved to be extremely helpful, and students responded positively. Fi-
nally, school boards must make clear in their literature to parents, at
town hall meetings, and at school board meetings that sexual harass-
ment is prevalent in schools. They also must inform parents that the
behavior will be disciplined and their cooperation is expected.
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